OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutes

Back to the Roots:

The Unfinished Post-Cold War Settlement of 1990: Historical-Narrative Workshops in Russia

Project report by Christian Nünlist, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich

SUMMARY

In cooperation with the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), a Russian member institute of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks, the most important findings of the 2017 Network report „The Road to the Charter of Paris" were presented at a workshop in Moscow on 8 November 2018 by four academics. About 100 hard copies of a Russian translation of the report were disseminated in Russia, and 200 hard copies have been printed to disseminate at future OSCE Network events. In Moscow, eminent Russian scholars critically reflected on the report and added valuable new insights. In addition, a new Russian partner was found to host a seminar with about 80 Russian international relations students in St. Petersburg on 7 November 2018, where the four academics also presented their views and debated controversial points with them. At both events, the authors not only discussed the findings of their OSCE Network report on 1989-90, but also presented new archival evidence just released by the Bill Clinton Presidential Library in Little Rock, Arkansas, in the summer of 2018, which documents the Clinton-Yeltsin discussions about NATO enlargement in the 1990s and allows new insights into a crucial episode on the path from cooperation (1990) to confrontation (2014).

OSCE Network
Логотип Сообщества аналитических центров
и академических институтов ОБСЕ

Дорога к
Парижской хартии
исторические нарративы и
уроки для ОБСЕ сегодня

BACKGROUND

Since 2015, the **OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions** has emphasized the importance of reconstructing the contested history of post-Cold War European Security in three successive annual projects. In its 2015 report "**Reviving Cooperative Security in Europe through the OSCE**", aimed at giving track II input to the OSCE Panel of Eminent Persons (PEP), the Network recommended to launch a panel of contemporary historians "to break down ingrained interpretations and myths and, consequently, promote historical reconciliation and (peace) mediation" (p. 11).[1] Ambassador Ischinger's PEP picked up the idea in its final report "**Back to Diplomacy**" in November 2015 and suggested to launch a "research project on the different narratives, on our common history, bringing together scholars from different countries, and aiming to set out more systematically our divergent views of the past, and how and why they developed".[2]

In 2016, the Network investigated these divergent historical narratives and published both the report "**European Security: Challenges at the Societal Level**"[3] and the edited volume **"Security Narratives in Europe"**[4]. The Network demonstrated that the traditionally held view of a narrative clash between "the West" and "Russia" or the PEP's description of three different views (West, Russia, In-between) was not reflecting the "wide range of views" on European Security within the OSCE space. The Network analyzed about 15 countries and differentiated between mainstream narratives (government, elite) and sub-dominant narratives (e.g. opposition parties, society).

In 2017, a follow-up project on "**The Road to the Charter of Paris**" focused on the years of 1989 and 1990. It argued that "the current tension between Russia and the West and the return to divided security in Europe have their root causes in an unfinished post-Cold War settlement after 1990, even if the West at the time felt it had achieved a fair new order for Europe's future." (p. 4). It added the views of historians to a plurality of interpretations about what allegedly happened and why in 1989 and 1990. Two workshops bringing together historians, eyewitnesses (former CSCE ambassadors), and representatives from 20 institutes of the OSCE Network injected more nuances and shades of gray into mostly black-and-white stories of success and failure in establishing Europe's post-Cold War strategic architecture. Amongst others, the authors recommended "to translate this report into Russian and discuss the findings at an OSCE Network workshop in Moscow in 2018" (p. 5).[5]

In 2017-18, **Christian Nünlist**, the principal author of the Network report, in related publications discussed the cycles of cooperation and confrontation between NATO and Russia as well as the "myth" of a "broken promise" of the West given in 1990 not to enlarge NATO to the East.[6] In addition, he actively participated in 2018 in a **German-Russian**

---

[1] Teija Tiilikainen (ed.), *Reviving Co-operative Security in Europe through the OSCE* (Hamburg: OSCE Network of Think Tanks, 2015).

[2] Panel of Eminent Persons (ed.), *Back to Diplomacy* (Vienna: OSCE, 2015).

[3] Wolfgang Zellner, *European Security: Challenges at the Societal Level* (Hamburg: OSCE Network of Think Tanks, 2016).

[4] Wolfgang Zellner (ed.), *Security Narratives in Europe: A Wide Range of Views* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2017).

[5] Christian Nünlist / Juhana Aunesluoma / Benno Zogg, *The Road to the Charter of Paris: Historical Narratives and Lessons for the OSCE* (Vienna: OSCE Network of Think Tanks, 2017).

[6] Christian Nünlist, „Contested History: Rebuilding Trust in European Security", in: *CSS Strategic Trends* (2017), pp. 11-34; Christian Nünlist, „Strategische Partner oder Antagonisten? Die

dialogue project, sponsored by the German foreign ministry, which also addressed the divergent historical narratives on the evolution of European Security from 1990 to 2014, inspired by the OSCE Network report "The Road to the Charter of Paris".[7]

Prof. **Laurien Crump-Gabrëels**, who participated in both 2017 workshops and had been asked by the three authors to join them for a presentation of the OSCE Network report at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Vienna in December 2017, also published lessons to be learned from the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) for European Security today.[8]

Beziehungen zwischen der NATO und Russland seit 1989", in: Florian Böller et al. (eds.), *Die Zukunft der transatlantischen Gemeinschaft: Externe und interne Herausforderungen* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2017), pp. 123-150; Christian Nünlist, „Krieg der Worte: Das Jahr 1990 und die NATO-Osterweiterung", in: *SIRIUS* 4/4 (2018), pp. 389-397.

[7] The project „Russia and the West: Towards a better understanding of what went wrong since the end of the Cold War" was coordinated by inmedio (Berlin) and the Institute of Law and Public Policy (Moscow). Two four-day workshops took place in September and November 2018 in Moscow and Berlin respectively, bringing together 18 participants. A project report (forthcoming) is focusing on „blind spots", namely events that prominently figure in the main narrative of one side, but are neglected in the main narrative of the other side. See Dirk Splinter et al., *Russian-Western Blind Spots: From Dialogue on Contested Narratives to Improved Understanding* (Berlin/Moscow: Inmedio/ILLP, forthcoming).

[8] Laurien C. Crump-Gabreëls, „Europese veiligheid onder druk: Een oproep tot een pan-Europese dialoog", in: *Atlantisch Perspectief* 41/1 (2017), pp. 21-26; Laurien C. Crump- Gabreëls, „Forty-five Years of Dialogue Facilitation (1972-2017): Ten Lessons from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe", in: *Security & Human Rights* 27/3-4 (2017), pp. 498-516.

SEMINAR IN ST. PETERSBURG, 7 NOVEMBER 2018

Juhana Aunesluoma, one of the co-authors of the report, facilitated a contact with **Kristina Minkova** (School of International Relations, St. Petersburg State University). The dean of the School of International Relations, Prof. **Natalia Tsvetkova**, organized and moderated a seminar on "Origins of a Cold Peace between Russia and the West: The Unfinished Cold War Settlement, 1989-2008", to be held on 7 November 2018, 11:00am to 1:00pm. The event was attended by about 80 students as well as several faculty members, including Prof. **Yury Akimov**.

Benno Zogg (Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich) introduced the background of the project, linking it to the OSCE Panel of Eminent Persons report „Back to Diplomacy" and described the method of „critical oral history", namely to confront eyewitnesses (in our case the high-level diplomats that had negotiated the 1990 CSCE Charter of Paris) with contemporary historians that had studied the archival evidence.

Juhana Aunesluoma (University of Helsinki) introduced key terms including "narrative", "myth", "facts" and presented our insights on narratives as both obstacles and opportunities for today's OSCE discussions.

Christian Nünlist (Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich) lectured on three crucial episodes on the road towards confrontation where the Western and Russian narratives diverge, including 1989-91 (end of the Cold War, German reunification, collapse of Soviet Union, based on the OSCE Network report), 1993-94 (Partnership for Peace vs. NATO expansion, based on new archival evidence), and 1999/2008 (Kosovo War and independence). He presented archival evidence from the US, demonstrating that despite all cooperative rhetoric, the George H.W. Bush administration was not interested in building a true partnership with the Soviet Union, but rather wanted to reap the fruits of the alleged US victory in the Cold War. During a key conversation with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in February 1990, Bush rejected considering to compromise with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on German membership in NATO.[9] Alternative pan-European visions were disregarded. Bush succeeded in building Europe's post-Cold War security architecture firmly on NATO, and thus US (military) presence in Europe.[10]

In October 1993, Bill Clinton's Secretary of State Christopher Warren explained to Boris Yeltsin in Moscow that the US would offer the NATO Partnership for Peace initiative to all former Warsaw Pact states, including Russia. He promised that "there would be no effort to exclude anyone and there would be no step taken at this time to push anyone ahead of others". In September 1994, however, Clinton informed Yeltsin that NATO would be extended to the East, but Russia would not yet be admitted. Yeltsin rightly felt betrayed. By March 1994, he complained during a meeting with Clinton: "I see nothing but humiliation for Russia if you proceed."[11] The US promises (Partnership for All rather than Membership

---

[9] Quoted in Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton, *The Last Superpower Summits: Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush: Conversations that Ended the Cold War* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2016), pp. 604f.

[10] See Jeffrey A. Engel, *When the World Seemed New: George H.W. Bush and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017); Liviu Horovitz, *Guns for Butter: The Political Economy of US Military Primacy* (unpublished PhD thesis, ETH Zurich, 2018).

[11] All quotes from James Goldgeier, "Promises Made, Promises Broken? What Yeltsin Was Told About NATO in 1993 and Why It Matters," in: *War on the Rocks*, 12 July 2016,

for a Few) from October 1993 and January 1994 were broken mostly due to domestic developments both in Russia (Yeltsin's shelling of the Parliament) and the US (mid-term elections).

Although not yet archive-based, the Kosovo War of 1999 and Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in 2008 were also presented as important episodes on the road towards confrontation between Russia and the West.[12]

Laurien Crump-Gabrëels concluded the presentations by contrasting the legacy of the CSCE facilitating a peaceful end of the Cold War with present tensions.

In a lively Q+A session, Russian students asked questions about the historical narratives and more broadly about Russia's place in European security and the role of the OSCE in facilitating a dialogue between Russia and the West. The students were well informed both about the evolution of European security after 1989 and also possessed a remarkable degree of knowledge about the OSCE. To engage with Russian students about historical narratives was a very rewarding exercise.

---

https://warontherocks.com/2016/07/promises-made-promises-broken-what-yeltsin-was-told-about-nato-in-1993-and-why-it-matters; ibid., "Bill and Boris: A Window Into a Most Important Post-Cold War Relationship", in: *Texas National Security Review*, 28 August 2018, https://tnsr.org/2018/08/bill-and-boris-a-window-into-a-most-important-post-cold-war-relationship.

[12] See e.g. William H. Hill, *No Place for Russia: European Security Institutions Since 1989* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), pp. 161-169, 254-259.

WORKSHOP IN MOSCOW, 8 NOVEMBER 2018

The format in Moscow was quite different. At an expert workshop, selected Russian scholars presented long interventions about the report, which we had sent them in advance in the Russian version. The workshop ran from 9:30am to 2:45pm, including lunch, and was co-organized with the **Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC)**. About 20 Russian experts participated in the event.

The workshop was opened by welcome remarks by **Timur Makhmutov**, RIAC's Deputy Director of Research, and **Cornelius Friesendorf** on behalf of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.

A first session contrasted the Western and Russian narratives about the evolution of European Security after 1989 and included the above described presentations by Juhana Aunesluoma (who chaired the sessions), Christian Nünlist, and Laurien Crump-Gabrëels.

Three substantial presentations by Russians scholars followed. **Mark Entin** (Head of the Department of European Law, International Law School, MGIMO University) reflected on his personal encounters with Mikhail Gorbachev. He emphasized that Soviet thinking in 1990 was marked by a high degree of idealism and a belief in words rather than deeds. In his view, Gorbachev really believed that the Soviet Union would be a future ally and partner of the West, and he saw a need for a new common, pan-European security structure in Europe. The CSCE was supposed to be the centerpiece of a new Europe. In reality, however, Russia was mostly left out from Europe's new security architecture, which focused on NATO, and today it is rather evident that the Post-Cold War settlement was unstable. In his concluding remarks, Entin praised the OSCE Network report as "very interesting" and "very encouraging" report. He felt that a future report could focus more on explaining important changes in perceptions of what happened.

Vladimir Baranovsky (Head of the Center for Situation Analysis, IMEMO, Russian Academy of Sciences) also had a "very positive impression" of the report. He liked the report and its historical approach much better than the PEP report "Back to Diplomacy". He praised the report as a "very rich picture of what has happened" in 1990. For Baranovsky, no single date and no particular decision can explain why the process that Gorbachev had started so positively in 1985 lead to the confrontation in 2014. As illustrated by the report, it was rather a step by step deterioration of relations and a rather slow process. Baranovsky emphasized that he did not think that there have been clear "missed opportunities" for better relations between Russia and the West. While he agreed that the analogy of a "new Cold War" was no accurate description of today's situation, he could see a lot of similarities. Lessons from the Cold War, however, could guide to possible ways out of the confrontation, in particular by closely studying the CSCE process. Baranovsky advanced three clusters of reasons why cooperation led to confrontation: 1) mistakes were made by both sides and the path to confrontation was mainly caused by misunderstandings and misreadings; 2) different agendas of major international actors led to conflicting cooperative and competitive approaches and to clashes of incompatible goals or at least hidden incompatible goals; 3) existential problems, namely that Russia is too big for Europe. He underlined that he felt that the report was timely and important, because it demonstrates that Western-Russian relations are not doomed to remain confrontational.

Andrei Zagorski (Head of Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Studies, IMEMO, Russian Academy of Sciences / Professor of International Relations at MGIMO University) emphasized that it was already clear by early April 1990 that the Soviets would accept reunited Germany in NATO. Focusing his intervention on the controversial issue of NATO expansion, Zagorski emphasized that preventing NATO expansion had never been a Russian foreign policy priority in the 1990s. Rather, the main goal was to get Russia involved in securing a voice and a veto in direct decision-making in European Security. Until 1994-95, Russian strategy centered on strengthening the CSCE/OSCE. He felt that Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev (1991-96) was privately rather relaxed about NATO expansion. His successor Yevgeny Primakov (1996-98) switched to damage-control tactics and traded NATO expansion with a NATO-Russia Foundation Act in 1997. Only in 2002, Vladimir Putin dropped the option of Russia joining NATO. For Zagorski, the most important event in the 25-year process from cooperation to confrontation was the 1999 Kosovo War. The Kosovo War led to a rethinking and a universal negative appraisal of NATO in Russia – whereas there had been a wide range of views on NATO in the 1990s.

P. Terrence Hopmann (School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC) critically reflected on the reports main findings on US foreign policy after 1989. He felt that the report suffered from "over determinism". In his view, East-West relations remained friendly much longer than 1990. The view was predominant in East and West that NATO enlargement could be consistent with a bigger role of the OSCE. There was no inherent incapability between NATO and the OSCE. Rather, a serious of unfortunate events – either mistakes or accidents – led to a gradual change and increased uncertainty and mistrust on both sides. Hopmann agreed with the importance of 1999-2000 as a key turning point, adding the crucial element of leadership changes both in the US (George W. Bush succeeding Clinton) and in Russia (Putin succeeding Yeltsin).

In response, **Christian Nünlist** (Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich) agreed that in the Clinton years (1993-2000), a more cooperative spirit might have been in place than during the George H.W. Bush years (1989-1992). The OSCE Network report only analyzed the years of 1989 and 1990, disclosing Bush's assertive foreign policy towards Europe, playing out the alleged US victory in the Cold War. However, Nünlist referred to the newly available archival evidence from the Clinton Presidential Library, which make clear that Clinton also played out US strength in his encounters with Yeltsin and failed to build a truly stable, inclusive European security architecture with a commonly agreed place for Russia.

Sergey Utkin (Head of Strategic Assessment Section, IMEMO, Russian Academy of Sciences) also characterized the short report as "good and useful", and he particularly liked the approach to go back to history and the archives. For him, the key sentence to describe US foreign policy at the end of the Cold War and the dawn of a new era was Bush's quote "We prevailed, and they didn't". Politicians always are more interested in short-term thinking, and thus Bush grasped the opportunities that the US victory in the Cold War offered for shaping the Post-Cold War European Security architecture. Utkin praised that the report challenges biased views on both sides and emphasizes that not only one side was wrong and to blame for the path to confrontation. He felt that domestic developments inside Russia, particularly the economic collapse and Chechnya, would need to be emphasized more.

Mikhail Lipkin (Director, Institute of General History, Russian Academy of Sciences) referred to an upcoming edited volume on 1989, including a contribution by Mary Elise Sarotte, and wondered whether new Russian archival evidence would allow a more nuanced reconstruction of events.

A second panel, chaired by **Benno Zogg** (Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich), discussed the use of the report on historical narratives to build trust in Russia-West relations. **Juhana Aunesluoma** (University of Helsinki) suggested splitting a reconciliation process into three distinct phases: 1) Dialogue among historians and eyewitnesses about 1990 – 2014 (as done in our project); 2) Deliberations among diplomats (e.g. in the OSCE); 3) Problem-solving, by using historical narratives as resources to explain the root causes to the other side.

Ambassador Fred Tanner (OSCE Secretariat) spoke about the current uncertainty about the OSCE and the concept of cooperative security. He recalled that the Panel of Eminent Persons (PEP) recommended in its report in 2015 that the normative framework did not need new rules, even when they were flagrantly violated. But there was a need to create political conditions to jointly implement the rules through common engagement wherever possible. He praised the Structured Dialogue and its focus on risk-reduction as a good start to find a positive unifying agenda within the OSCE through "islands of cooperation" and small, positive steps.

Andrei Zagorski (IMEMO) contributed with summarizing his experience in Russian-Polish reconciliation through debating different narratives, different histories, and different memories. He pointed to a project looking at the relations between Russia and seven Central and Eastern European countries plus Germany. In a first step, individual papers looked at bilateral relations from both perspectives (e.g. Russian and Polish narratives). In a second step, the two separate papers were converted into a co-authored chapter. To achieve this, the facts were compared on which the individual papers were based. Differences how the facts were interpreted were then addressed even if often not overcome. Through dialogue workshops, nuances were added – similarly as in the OSCE Network project "Road to the Charter of Paris".

POSSIBLE FOLLOW-UP PROJECTS

- In November 2020, the Charter of Paris will be 30 years old. 2020 would thus be a great opportunity to convene a major **academic conference** on the significance of the unfinished settlement of the Cold War for Russia's later isolation from the West. Cold War historians would present their latest findings from archival research on 1989-90. Laurien Crump-Gabrëels could be the OSCE Network's point of contact for such a conference.
- Concerning Russian archival sources, the OSCE Network could engage **Mikhail Lipkin** and the Institute of General History as a potential partner to declassify Russian sources from 1989-90 and to contribute an archival research based paper to the 2020 conference.
- Using the same method as for the "Road to the Charter of Paris" report, the OSCE Network could consider supporting **critical oral history workshops** on the controversial question of **NATO's expansion in the 1990s**.
- A follow-up project to the historical narratives project could focus on **contested interpretations on core OSCE principles**, including the non-intervention principles. Such a project could use the same methodology as our project or apply the steps mentioned above by Zagorski (e.g. preparing Russian and Western versions of how the non-intervention principle was interpreted from 1990 to today; then discussing the facts and how differently they were interpreted and finally add nuances).
- Within Track 1, we would encourage OSCE participating States to engage with the findings of our project, including the importance of **adding nuances**, applying **historical empathy**, and demonstrating **political leadership** to overcome mistrust and enemy images. To begin such a reconciliation process between Russia and the West, both sides need to self-critically consider mistakes made by themselves.

Somewhat unexpectedly, US President Donald Trump demonstrated such a capability for self-critical reflection, when he told Vladimir Putin at their summit meeting in Helsinki: "I do feel that we have both made some mistakes." He added: "The disagreements between our two countries are well known … But if we're going to solve many of the problems facing our world, then we're going to have to find ways to cooperate in pursuit of shared interests." Trump denied that there was a Cold War 2.0: "The Cold War is a thing of the past". He suggested creating an "expert council that would include political scientists, prominent diplomats and former military experts in both countries who would look for points of contact between the two countries."[13]

President Trump thus showed empathy and suggested an "islands of cooperation" approach between Russia and the United States by outlining first steps for improving the relationship to restore an acceptable level of trust through dialogue rather than pursuing a repetition of the Cold War confrontation – all very much in line with the recommendations of our OSCE Network report on historical narratives.

---

[13] *Full Transcript of the Helsinki Press Conference*, 17 July 2018, https://www.vox.com/2018/7/16/17576956/transcript-putin-trump-russia-helsinki-press-conference.

Annex 1: Agenda of St. Petersburg Seminar, 7 November 2018

School of International Relations
Saint-Petersburg State University

OSCE Network
OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions

Origins of a Cold Peace between Russia and the West: The Unfinished Cold War Settlement, 1989-2008

Venue: School of International Relations of Saint Petersburg State University

St. Petersburg, Smolny street, Entrance VIII

Wednesday, 7 November 2018, 11:00am – 1:00pm

Welcome remarks by Natalia Tsvetkova, Dean

Presentations by Benno Zogg, Juhana Aunesluoma, Christian Nünlist, and Laurien Crump-Gabreëls

Discussion, moderated by Natalia Tsvetkova

Annex 2: Agenda of Moscow Seminar, 8 November 2018

OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions

OSCE NETWORK OF THINK TANKS SEMINAR

«THE ROAD TO CHARTER OF PARIS:
HISTORICAL NARRATIVES AND LESSONS FOR THE OSCE TODAY»

November 08, 2018

Venue: Moscow, Alexander House Business Centre, 1, Bolshaya Yakimanka St.

09:30-10:00	**Registration and welcome coffee**

10:00-10:15	**Welcome remarks**

Timur MAKHMUTOV, RIAC Deputy Director of Programs

Cornelius FRIESENDORF, Senior Researcher, Institute For Peace Research And Security Policy At The University Of Hamburg

10:15-11:45	**Session 1. Contrasting narratives about the evolution of European Security after 1989**

Chair:
Juhana AUNESLUOMA, Vice-Dean, University of Helsinki

Key discussion participants:
Christian NÜNLIST, Senior Researcher, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich

Laurien CRUMP, Prof., University of Utrecht

Mark ENTIN, Head of the Department of European Law, International Law School, MGIMO University

Vladimir BARANOVSKY Head of the Center for Situation Analysis, IMEMO RAS, RIAC Member

Issues for discussion:

- *What were the reasons that the vision of an inclusive, pan-European security architecture could not be implemented in 1989-90?*
- *Why did the West move away from its 1993 promise of a "NATO Partnership for all" rather than "NATO Membership for a few"?*
- *What impact did NATO's crisis management in Bosnia have on Russian-West relations in the 1990s?*

11:45-12:15	**Coffee break**

12:15-13:45	**Session 2. Use of the academic work on historical narratives to build trust in Russia-West relations**

Chair:
Benno ZOGG, Researcher, CSS, ETH Zurich

Key discussion participants:
Juhana AUNESLUOMA, Vice-Dean, University of Helsinki

Fred TANNER, OSCE Secretariat

Andrei ZAGORSKI, Head of Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Studies, IMEMO, Russian Academy of Sciences / Professor of International Relations at MGIMO University)

Issues for discussion:

- *How can new insights, based on archival research and historical studies, be fed into Track 1 dialogue (e.g. the OSCE Structured Dialogue)?*
- *Does debate over "missed opportunities" contribute to mutual empathy and better understanding the other side?*
- *What are the main lessons for the OSCE and Russian-West relations today?*

13:45-14:00	**Closing remarks**
14:00-14:45	**Lunch**

Annex 3: List of Participants, Moscow Seminar, 8 November 2018

Seminar

**« THE ROAD TO CHARTER OF PARIS:
HISTORICAL NARRATIVES AND LESSONS FOR THE OSCE TODAY »**

November 8, 2018

Participants List

1.	AUNESLUOMA Juhana	Vice-Dean, University of Helsinki
2.	BARANOVSKY Vladimir	Head of the Center for Situation Analysis, Russian Academy of Sciences, Member of the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations Directorate, Russian Academy of Sciences, RIAC Member
3.	BELOBROB Yurii	Leading Researcher of the Diplomatic Academy
4.	BURLINOVA Natalya	President, Center for Support and Development of Public Initiatives Creative Diplomacy.
5.	CRUMP Laurien	Prof., University of Utrecht
6.	ENTIN Mark	Head of the Department of European Law, International Law School, MGIMO University
7.	FRIESENDORF Cornelius	Senior Researcher, Institute fr Peace Research and Security Policy at The University of Hamburg
8.	GRAEF Alexander	University of St. Gallen
9.	HOPMANN Terrence	Professor, Johns Hopkins University
10.	LIPKIN Mikhail	Director Institute of General History of RAS
11.	MAKHMUTOV Timur	RIAC Deputy Director of Programs
12.	MEHMEDBEGOVIĆ Naida	Researcher, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg
13.	NEUNECK Götz	Deputy Director, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at The University of Hamburg
14.	NÜNLIST Christian	Senior Researcher, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich

15.	PEREZ-VADILLO Alberto	Spanish Embassy in Moscow
16.	POJMAN Ruth	Senior Advisor, Global Initiative Against Transnational organized Crime
17.	MAIKA Roman	RIAC Program Assistant
18.	SHAKIROV Oleg	Consultant, PIR-Center
19.	TANNER Fred	Senior Advisor to the Director, Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), OSCE, Vienna
20.	UTKIN Sergey	Head of Strategic Assessment Section, Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences
21.	ZAGORSKI Andrei	Director of the Department of Disarmament and Conflict Resolution, IMEMO RAS, RIAC Member
22.	ZOGG Benno	Researcher, CSS, ETH Zurich