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REPORT
OSCE NETWORK WORKSHOP
CRISIS MANAGEMENT, ESCALATION CONTROL AND SUB-REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN THE OSCE AREA

Conventional Arms Control Discussion Project on Reducing the Risks of Conventional Deterrence

23–24 November 2021

Venue: Warsaw, Polish Institute of International Affairs, ul. Warecka 1a

DECEMBER 2021
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) and the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH) co-convened a workshop on escalation control and sub-regional arms control that for the first time brought together experts from Western European countries, Russia (virtually) and the region of Central Europe (Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine)\. Discussions were unusually open and frank, even for a track 2 event. The most important result was that, under the current circumstances, participants from the region objected without exceptions to hard arms control measures such as ceilings and limitations, even if above current holdings, whereas Western and Russian experts continued to advocate for such limitations. There was, however, agreement among all experts that CSBMs of all kinds, including Incidents at Sea Agreements, Agreements on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, a reformed Vienna Document as well as CSBMs beyond the VD11, can contribute to crisis management and escalation control and should be properly implemented, adapted and modernised as needed.

INTRODUCTION

PISM and the IFSH jointly hosted an OSCE Network arms control workshop in Warsaw, 23–24 November 2021. The workshop served as an opportunity to discuss the merits of CSBMs and sub-regional conventional arms control as means of crisis management and escalation control in the region. Its background was a 2018 Network study on “Reducing the Risks of Conventional Deterrence in Europe: Arms Control in the NATO-Russia Contact Zones” that had set the scene for lively discussions in Vienna. It had triggered some support, but also substantial criticism. The Warsaw workshop that continued these discussions was funded by the Austrian Ministry for European and International Affairs, the German Federal Foreign Office and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.

PARTICIPANTS

The workshop was attended by 26 physical participants – 11 from Poland, seven from Germany and one each from Estonia, Latvia, the Slovak Republic, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, Ukraine, and the US. In addition, the workshop hosted several virtual participants, including two panellists from Russia and one from Germany. The 26 participants included eight women, and the average age of participants was considerably lower than in comparable events. The donor side was represented by the Swiss Ambassador to Poland and a representative of the German Federal Foreign Office (cf. Annex 2, List of Participants).

The following report sketches the presentations and discussions in each of the workshop’s six sessions (cf. Annex 1, Agenda).

The workshop was opened with welcome remarks by Cornelius Friesendorf, Head of CORE, IFSH, and by Lukasz Kulesa, Deputy Head of the Research Office, PISM.

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1 Experts from Belarus were invited to participate, but in the end did not participate.
SESSION 1: FACTORS DRIVING MILITARY ESCALATION

One of the presenters focused on the Russian threat that was seen as very substantial. Accordingly, Russia is following three goals: First, restoring strategic control over the post-Soviet area with a focus on Ukraine. Second, establishing a buffer zone in Central Europe within NATO. And third, minimising the US presence in Europe. This is accompanied with troop movements around Ukraine, Russia’s activities on Belarus and the current energy crisis.

Russian behaviour is worsened by the following factors:

- Foreign policy behaviour is subordinated to domestic developments.
- Lack of transparency is used as an instrument of deterrence.
- Capabilities for fast escalation are developed.
- Broad linkages between different issues decrease chances for finding solutions.
- Tendency of overexploiting nuclear weapons.

The second presenter stressed that the focus should be shifted from laudable but unrealistic efforts to modernise arms control agreements to preserving those that we have. The US withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty has wider implications, including on the VD. It is unrealistic to expect Russia to change its position on modernising the VD when the US is becoming less transparent to Russia.

Regarding new elements, primary attention should be aimed at areas of greatest concern; one of which is the Baltic region. The essence of an arrangement for the Baltic region could be as follows. Russia could consider significantly lowering the intensity of its military activity in the Western Military District, ensuring that forces in the Pskov and Kaliningrad regions take a more defensive posture with a pledge not to strengthen them in the future. NATO countries would do the same regarding their armed forces in the region. The key element would be the strict limitation of all movements of forces towards the line of contact.

The third presenter stated that trust has been broken. The sides are strengthening military capabilities, whereas the safety net of arms control and CSBM is being cut away. The issue at stake is the threat of surprise attacks in the NATO-Russia contact zones, not a big strategic exchange. Sides are heading towards a high escalation in the Ukraine conflict. Renewed high-level efforts are necessary to defuse the crisis in and around Ukraine, which is the biggest trigger for military escalation in Europe.
Discussion:

One discussant stressed that there is no symmetry in Russia’s and NATO’s actions, neither in exercises nor in rhetoric. Miscalculation and misperceptions are the biggest dangers. Russian policy is built on images close to worst-case scenarios. There is the belief that the West may shy away from conflict at any rate. You have to push more to get more – a dangerous dilemma.

Another discussant said that incidents are not good, but do not have escalation potential. Politically-coloured incidents however, such as certain actions in Ukraine, are crossing Russian red lines and are dangerous. Channels of communication are crucial.

A third discussant asked why Russia has given up on arms control although it had invested in it a lot at earlier stages.

Another discussant stated that Russian military spending is currently stable. He/she asked whether a new form of détente might be possible that included strengthened defence and deterrence.

Still another discussant clarified that a buffer zone within NATO would mean zones of low armaments that would create a certain guarantee for Russia but would constitute a formal discrimination of some NATO allies. Without raising the costs for Russia, there is no incentive for Russia to go for détente.

Other discussants pointed to the danger of escalation, assessed that German leaders would be sceptical on such an approach, and asked how Russia might combine ambitious goals with its limited means.

A last discussant stated that threats that were predicted to be dangerous – incidents, snap exercises – are now seen as less dangerous. The biggest threat is that military escalation works and that you can get a lot by using it. Time is not ripe for new détente, but rather for small, specific issues to be resolved.
SESSION 2:
ARRANGEMENTS DIRECTLY ADDRESSING THE DANGER OF ESCALATION

The first presenter stated that incident prevention arrangements can prevent incidents and escalations by reducing misinterpretation. Thus, it can dampen tensions, save lives and prevent injuries. Maintaining fora for dialogue can clarify intentions. However, in the current security environment, brinkmanship is intentional and is seen as crucial for deterrence. Thus, mechanisms to prevent and discuss incidents are particularly important.

Moscow likes in theory mil-mil contacts but walked away from the NATO-Russia Council; likes to pick and choose its interlocutors but, for example, has welcomed a range of channels with the US. Current communications are not sufficient. Russia wants cyber dialogue / arrangements, but parties define the terms in different ways.

The second presenter diagnosed a fragmented landscape of different kinds of agreements. Twelve Incidents at Sea Agreements (INCSEA), all modelled on the 1972 US-Soviet agreement, establish rules of behaviour, methods of communication, exchange of information and create bodies to evaluate implementation processes. Agreements on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (DMA) extend the INCSEA logic to land and territorial waters. The Vienna Document provides the para. 17 procedure for “incidents of a military nature”. And finally, there are ad-hoc mechanisms such as the “Baltic Sea Project Team”.

Proposals for improvements included:

- More bilateral INCSEAs or a NATO - Russia agreement.
- New generation agreements merging INCSEAs with DMA covering the full range of military activities.
- In the OSCE: preparing a handbook or code of conduct on military incidents, operationalising para. 17.

The third presenter focused on naval incidents saying that measures to reduce risks do not tackle the underlying disagreements. The deteriorating security environment means that there are more and more complex contestations that deliberately engineer jeopardy. Examples include Russian-Ukrainian cases of blocking ship lines, life fire exercises in the Black Sea and incidents using electronic jamming and interference technologies. Existing agreements could be better adapted by:

- Upgrading old agreements to new contexts.
- Adding measures used elsewhere, i.e. those contained in the code of conduct in the ASEAN framework.
- Using the EU Eastern Partnership as a possible forum for dialogue by adding a security panel.
- Making more use of the OSCE Structured Dialogue.
Discussion:

While there seemed to be broad agreement that arrangements to prevent escalation are needed, the discussion focussed on their applicability and utility in the Belarus-EU border crisis. One discussant stated that the Belarus border crisis has a military dimension. Another replied that not everything that is security is military. However, there is a tendency to use military means.

Regarding bilateral Polish-Belarusian agreements, one discussant said they exist, have not been cancelled but are not used frequently. Another one added that these agreements were seen as useful, meetings were taking place, but as many other instruments, they are good-weather instruments that cannot mitigate the situation. Yet, another discussant added that the Polish-Belarusian mil-mil contacts were used twice in recent times, and there are also contacts in Vienna. Some form of mil-mil contacts is needed.

Regarding border management and refugee issues, one discussant stated that this will be a perpetual problem for Europe. Lukashenko declined participation in an Eastern Partnership meeting on the issue. But if we see the refugee border crisis as a long-term problem, we will need dialogue and solutions, soldiers will not bring solutions.
SESSION 3:
REFORMING THE VIENNA DOCUMENT

The first presenter stressed that while the VD was negotiated in parallel with the CFE Treaty, its nature, purpose, area of application, scope and provisions differ significantly. While the CFE Treaty aimed to curtail offensive force capabilities, the purpose of the VD was to ensure transparency of military activities. The VD scope of information is much smaller than that of the CFE Treaty. The VD verification regime is only a fraction of what the CFE Treaty provides: Up until 2007, there were almost 50 (plus ten) annual CFE inspections in Russia, whereas the VD allows for only three evaluation visits. Thus, the VD can in no way replace hard arms control of the type of the CFE Treaty.

Current proposals for modernising the VD focus only on lowering the thresholds for notification of military exercises, increasing the verification quota and introducing more verification options under Chapter III (Risk Reduction). However, it would be necessary to cover not only ground and air force formations, but also other military units such as air defence units, naval forces including long-range strike systems, naval infantry, and internal security forces. Any destabilising force accumulation in strike distance to borders needs to be constrained – this also applies to snap and parallel exercises.

The second presenter started by saying that the security situation in Poland and in the Baltic states is threatened on a daily basis by hybrid threats and a build-up of forces at the Ukrainian border. Thus, the existing framework of commitments is severely put to the test. Russia refuses to engage constructively in the modernisation process of the VD and seems to be unwilling to play by the rules. This seems to be the root cause of the current malaise.

He/she continued by saying that Latvia has fairly strong views about the regionalisation of arms control. This is seen as going against the principle of indivisibility of security. Any future arms control regime must avoid creating different levels of security for the parties involved.

The third presenter pledged for ‘making the VD great again’. The VD is the last standing bloc that matters. Currently, there are two challenges – Covid and the Russian reluctance to discuss the proposals that are on the table. Thinking big is not going to work at this stage. The most important elements are lowering the thresholds, including snap exercises through notification and information as well as improvement of the risk reduction Chapter III.
Discussion:

While one discussant remarked that ‘making the VD great again’ does not work and modernising the VD without having CFE and Open Skies is problematic, another replied that there are no incentives for allies to go for larger steps.

Still another discussant stated that CFE and VD are children of another time when there was confidence and trust that no longer exist, thus these measures lack the basis on which they were built. Russia could make gestures to show they are serious.

Yet another discussant stated that increased US military presence can bring Russia to the negotiating table, adding that 1999 was the last substantial modernisation of the VD. He/she continued asking whether it might make sense to look for legally binding measures or to go for sub-regional CSBMs. Two other discussants stated that sub-regional arms control is difficult for deterrence and that the security of NATO is indivisible.
SESSION 4:
CSBMS BEYOND THE VD11 –
NEW PROBLEMS AND NEW PROPOSALS

The first presenter stated that thinking about progress in conventional arms control and CBMs currently represents a theoretical effort, but it is right to prepare for a time when conditions are ripe. The first CBM was in the Helsinki Final Act, they were invented for a very different environment. Now, we have more players, intra- and interstate conflicts, threats from non-state actors, hybrid threats – traditional CSBMs are not designed to address these changes.

Can we imagine CSBMs for non-state actors? Probably not. Non-military, political, civilian, economic CSBMs? We should be creative to go beyond military CSBMs. Cyber CSBMs are a must, but no idea how to do it.

Classical CSBMs should apply to all kinds of forces. Revive bilateral CSBMs, i.e. mil-mil Poland-Belarus channels. Allow the CPC to act as an analytical unit with a status comparable to ODIHR. CSBMs are essentially good-weather measures. When the Crimea crisis erupted, the CPC never achieved evaluation visits despite all efforts. Status-neutral CSBM recommendations were never implemented. CSBMs are the second step, the first is to rebuild trust. Currently, the only future of conventional arms control is CSBMs.

The second presenter assessed that after the withdrawal of the US and Russia from the OS Treaty, NATO might have an interest in surveying Belarus’ borders as well as the Finnish-Russian border. Vice versa, Russia might have been interested in missile defence sites, US military facilities in Germany and in the Baltic states. After the Bulgarian, Canadian/French and Swedish aircrafts will be out in 2022, only four aircrafts are available – Hungary, Romania, Ukraine, and Turkey. The German aircraft has still to be certified.

Can OS technology be used for other purposes? Thinkable is use for environmental purposes explicitly mentioned in the treaty. Also use for evaluating disaster situations as Germany did during the 2021 floods emergency. With Belarus in the OS Treaty, NATO has sufficient inventive to continue with OS.

The third presenter addressed Emerging and Disrupting Technologies (EDT) that will most likely have an impact on conventional and nuclear deterrence, stability and conflict. One classification attempt distinguishes between “distorting technologies”, which interrupt and distort data flows, “compressing technologies”, which shorten decision-making time, “thwart technologies” such as directed energy weapons and “illuminating technologies” such as the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI).
Together, we might move away from predictable escalatory pathways and crisis escalation might follow a dynamic where competing states change between sub-conventional and strategic levels of conflict in accelerated non-linear ways. Recommendations for dealing with EDTs include:

- Strengthening domestic resilience.
- Entering into a dialogue. The US-Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue Working Group on Capabilities and Actions with Strategic Effects is a welcome beginning.
- Transparency on intentions, capabilities and doctrines.
- Keeping communications lines open.
- Developing de-escalation measures.

**Discussion:**

One discussant asked whether AI applications comparable to building digital twins in the civilian sphere are known in the military realm. One presenter remarked that there is information on such efforts from the UK MoD and in Israel. Another discussant contributed that there are projects at the War Data Centre of King’s College and at the University of Cambridge.

Another discussant stated that verification by social media is happening. Still another discussant said that without a proper framework the reliance of social media verification is doubtful.
SESSION 5: SUB-REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL OPTIONS

The first presenter outlined the main features of the 2018 study “Reducing the Risks of Conventional Deterrence in Europe. Arms Control in the NATO-Russia Contact Zones” (RISK Study). The six key items of this approach are:

- A sufficiently large zone of limitations including parts of major states such as Germany and Russia.
- No additional deployment of substantial combat forces close to Russian / NATO borders.
- Limiting exercises in the Contact Zone.
- Addressing long-range strike weapons by verified information exchange.
- Unilateral measures by larger states.
- Sufficient transparency and verification measures.

The presenter also addressed the four main critical arguments against the RISK Study:

- The charge that the proposal creates a ‘buffer zone’ – this is not the case because parts of major states such as Germany and Russia are included.
- There cannot be business as usual with Russia – why modernisation of the VD, but no other arms control issues?
- Arms control diverts attention from defence – arms control should be seen as a supplementary element to defence.
- And finally: Russia shows no interest in arms control – this should be tested by serious Western proposals beyond transparency measures.

The second presenter stressed one should avoid speaking about sub-regional arms control. The RISK proposal goes far beyond the region and is essentially a NATO-Russia disengagement agreement with different zones where different measures apply. The main features of this proposal are no permanent deployments, infrastructure and military activities in the disengagement zone (that does not mean reductions), as well as limitations on movements of forces from outside into the zone. Plus verifiable transparency of mobile forces, maritime activities and long-range strike capabilities outside of the zone.

The presenter objected to a nexus to Ukraine. First, it would be a dangerous attempt to resolve conflicts through arms control. Second, this would be immediately rejected by Moscow. A gradual approach should be permitted without losing sight of the overall perspective. The presenter proposed to revise the RISK Study in light of the discussion.

The third presenter started by saying that limitations in the Baltic Sea region or in the whole of Central and Eastern Europe are not beneficial, whereas transparency measures are worth exploring. Proposals to freeze or reduce the Western military presence in the Baltic region would help Russia to increase its advantage over NATO in this region. This is the case because Russia has more ‘ready’ forces close to this sub-region and Russia has been adapting its forces towards potential conflict with NATO longer than the Western alliance has.
The rejection of sub-regional arms control does not mean support for an unlimited military build-up. More reciprocal transparency would be a welcome step for managing confrontation and lowering tensions. The main problems are political. Why should NATO undertake new commitments when Russia violates and circumvents existing ones? First, we need a sign from Russia that it is serious and ready to modernise and fully implement the Vienna Document. Second, we can think about additional transparency measures.

Discussion:

One discussant stressed that we should try to make intentional escalation harder. Another agreed saying that it is not only about avoiding unintended escalation.

Another discussant asked whether the self-defence capabilities of the Baltic states are perceived as a threat by Russia? What could one reduce in the Baltic states with their small armed forces? This would mean giving up our defence. Russia asks to give up infrastructure and to limit exercises, which would mean to give up NATO defence and readiness to defend the Baltic states. The starting point should be the question as to what Russia intends to do.

Another discussant replied that the proposal is not about reductions, but about ceilings above existing forces. And it is about NATO and Russia, not the Baltic States. Still another discussant asked why Russia should agree to reductions given its aim to accumulate forces? What carrot can NATO offer to Russia?

Yet another discussant remarked that we start thinking from the current political conditions. But what will happen if the US lose interest in military deployments in Europe in a mid-term perspective? Then Europe would have to defend itself alone and can choose between a significant military build-up or introducing elements of arms control.

Another discussant remarked that there is a debate in Russia on engaging in conventional arms control with NATO and that the Russian military establishment has its own concerns related among others to the Baltic States.

The crucial role of Germany was mentioned. Another discussant said that it would be catastrophic if Germany decides not to invest into its armed forces. If Germany does not invest in times of deteriorating security, it is giving way to Russia. Still another discussant brought up the role of Finland and Sweden in sub-regional arms control. Does arms control as an alternative to the build-up of forces mean that Europe should give up on its strategic autonomy? Another discussant replied that Finland and Sweden could consider joining the instrument. Arms control does not mean demilitarisation. The proposal is about reducing offensive capabilities, not limiting only us but both sides.
SESSION 6: BRAINSTORMING SUB-REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL TALKS

One discussant mentioned that Sweden dislikes the report. The report would open up the domestic discussion about NATO membership. And in 2019 Sweden adopted the largest modernisation programme of its armed forces and dislikes everything that complicates matters.

Another discussant stressed the importance of the centre of gravity of arms control proposals. Is there a danger of shooting on the wrong target? We keep focusing on Northern Europe whereas the region where CSBM are most urgently needed is the South (Black Sea). Would this proposal mean an increased threat for other regions? If you disengage in one region, where will the forces go? Are we in danger of doing arms control for arms control’s sake? The nuclear dimension and the Strategic Stability Talks are relevant for the region. If there is progress here, does this open up more space for European arms control?

Still another discussant observed that the red lines are no isolation and no disarmament. There are differing views on constraining capacities.

Another discussant stated that German arms control proposals must be accompanied by an increase of German military spending sufficient to fulfil NATO commitments. Only then can Germany forward arms control proposals. From a Polish perspective, the NATO-Russia Founding Act is dead. Moving more troops into this part of NATO and raising the stakes for Russia would move Russia to talk about arms control. Another discussant added that limiting forces is currently neither desirable nor feasible, however, transparency could be in line with deterrence.

Another discussant was confident that Moscow will not take the first step against any NATO member state. In Russian thinking, a war starts in Belarus or Ukraine. It can spill over to NATO, but it starts in the Black Sea region where NATO tries to deter Russia by means of ambiguity. Russians are willing to escalate in Ukraine. Clarify in NATO who is willing to do what with what consequences and share it with Kyiv and to some extent with Moscow. Two tracks: the long-term idea is stability – after a war or after we get frightened enough – but before this happens transparency is not so simple because of disagreement on what you want to be transparent.

Another discussant stated that a strategy of raising the stakes to bring Moscow to the table is dangerous. For Germans it is difficult to understand why Polish behaviour is legitimate and German behaviour is not. The discussant replied that we have a concept and objectives in NATO that Germany has agreed with. So, fulfil these commitments first to be credible on arms control proposals.

Another discussant remarked that without arms control measures you might fear that Russia relocates troops in Belarus, and you have to live with this fear. Otherwise, you will have a say on what is stationed and what is not stationed. The Black Sea is much more dangerous than Northern Europe in terms of triggering a nuclear war. The US put forward the proposal to include all nuclear warheads into a new START follow-up treaty, which would include TNW.
Yet another discussant expressed his understanding for the calls on Germany, including credibility. Arms control is not an effort to evade NATO solidarity. Germany has the 6th biggest military budget in the world, the question is whether this is spent effectively. Arms control has always dealt with sub-regions and geographical asymmetries. We should stop the process of accumulating military power.

Another discussant also showed understanding for the concerns raised. However, thinking solely in military terms might prove too narrow. One must take into account political change.

The workshop was concluded by closing remarks by Lukasz Kulesa, Deputy Head of the Research Office, PISM, and Wolfgang Zellner, Senior Research Fellow, IFSH
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OSCE Network Workshop

Crisis Management, Escalation Control and Sub-Regional Arms Control in the OSCE Area

Conventional Arms Control Discussion Project on Reducing the Risks of Conventional Deterrence

23–24 November 2021

Venue: Warsaw, Polish Institute of International Affairs, ul. Warecka 1a

Agenda

Tuesday, 23 November

9:00–9:30 Coffee and registration

9:30–9:45 Welcome remarks

- Cornelius Friesendorf, Head of CORE, IFSH
- Łukasz Kulesa, Deputy Head of the Research Office, PISM

9:45–11:15 Session 1: Factors Driving Military Escalation

- Capabilities and doctrines
- Military signalling and brinkmanship
- Military exercises
- Incidents and accidents

Moderator: Anna Dyner, Analyst, International Security Programme, PISM

Speakers:

- Marek Menkiszak, Head of the Russian Department, Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW)
- Oleg Shakirov, Senior Expert, Center for Advanced Governance; Consultant, PIR Center (participating remotely)
- Simon Weiss, Researcher, Regional Office for Cooperation and Peace in Europe, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (participating remotely)

11:15–11:30 Coffee break

11:30–12:45 Session 2: Arrangements Directly Addressing the Danger of Escalation

- Baltic Sea Project team results
- Agreements modelled on the US-Soviet 1972 Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas Agreement
ANNEX I: WORKSHOP AGENDA

- Hotlines and other pol-mil and mil-to-mil channels
- Proposal on Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities Agreement combined with European Risk Reduction Centre
- Proposal on amending paragraph 17 of the Vienna Document

Moderator: Cornelius Friesendorf, Head of CORE, IFSH

Speakers:
- Ian Anthony, Director of European Security Programme, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
- Łukasz Kulesa, Deputy Head of the Research Office, PISM
- Olga Oliker, Program Director, Russia and Central Asia, International Crisis Group

12:45–13:45 Lunch

13:45–15:00 Session 3: Reforming the Vienna Document
- Inclusion of all kinds of forces in a VD notification and observation regime
- Limitations of military exercises and transfers (snap + parallel exercises; exercises close to borders)
- Notification on naval forces

Moderator: Katarina Kertysova, Policy Fellow, European Leadership Network (ELN)

Speakers:
- Dominik Jankowski, Head of the Political Section, Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Poland to NATO
- Imants Lieģis, Senior Research Fellow, Latvian Institute of International Affairs (LIIA)
- Wolfgang Richter, Senior Associate, International Security Division, The German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)

15:00–15:15 Coffee break

15:15–16:30 Session 4: CSBMs Beyond the VD11 – New Problems and New Proposals
- Addressing the consequences of Open Skies Treaty withdrawals
- CSBMs and risk reduction in cyberspace and with regard to emerging and disruptive technologies
- CSBMs and grey zone crises

Moderator: Pia Fuhrhop, Associate, International Security Division, SWP

Speakers:
- Samuel Charap, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation (participating remotely)
- Alexander Graef, Researcher, IFSH
- Adam Kobieracki, Former Director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre
- Katarzyna Kubiak, Senior Policy Fellow, ELN

19:00 - 21:00 Dinner [guest speaker TBC]
Wednesday, November 24

9:00–10:30 Session 5: Sub-Regional Arms Control Options
- Proposals for sub-regional arms control regime for Northern Europe/Baltic area
- Potential conceptual advantages and challenges
- Conditions and framework for negotiations

Moderator: Łukasz Kulesa, Deputy Head of the Research Office, PISM

Speakers:
- Evgeny Buzhinsky, Chairman of the Executive Board, PIR Center (participating remotely)
- Artur Kacprzyk, Analyst, International Security Programme, PISM
- Wolfgang Zellner, Senior Research Fellow, IFSH

10:30–10:45 Coffee break

10:45–12:15 Session 6: Brainstorming Sub-Regional Arms Control Talks
- Identifying likely preferences, main aims, and red lines for countries in the region
- Identifying potential areas of convergence

Co-moderators:
- Andrey Zagorski, Head of Department for Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Studies at the Evgeniy Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences (participating remotely)
- Wolfgang Zellner, Senior Research Fellow, IFSH

Open discussion

12:15–12:30 Closing remarks
- Łukasz Kulesa, Deputy Head of the Research Office, PISM
- Wolfgang Zellner, Senior Research Fellow, IFSH
Reference Literature:

- Covington, Steven R., The Culture of Strategic Thought Behind Russia’s Modern Approaches to Warfare, Belfer Center, October 2016.
- Schaller, Benjamin, Strengthening the Role of the OSCE in Times of Increased Tensions and Emerging Crisis situations: The Untapped Potential in the European Arms Control Framework, Geneva 2021 (GCSP Issue 14).
### List of Participants

**23–24 November 2021**

**Venue:** Warsaw, Polish Institute of International Affairs, ul. Warecka 1a

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position and Affiliation</th>
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<tbody>
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